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ABSTRACT
Despite the phenomenal growth in the digital world and crimes committed using digital
techniques and tools, there are literally no foundational requirements to perform digital
forensic investigations. While there are several private and mostly for-profit organizations
that “sell” training and certifications regarding digital forensics credentials, at the federal
and state level in the United States, there seem to be nothing of the kind.
Keywords: Digital forensics, certification(s), computer forensics, digital evidence, quality
assurance, licensing requirements, credentials, private investigator (PI), Computer Forensics
Innocence Project
1. INTRODUCTION
Despite the wide variety of areas in the med-
ical field and that of the legal field, both re-
quiring credentialing and accreditation at the
state and at times the national level, there
are no such requirements for digital forensic
investigators. It is fair to state that a person
caught practicing medicine without a state
license or a degree from an accredited insti-
tution, would be sued and even prosecuted.
It is also fair to state that most people would
not trust a doctor or a lawyer who was not a
graduate of a properly accredited university
with proper credentials from a state or fed-
eral government. Even becoming a private
investigator (PI) usually requires licensing in
most states.
Digital forensic investigation is one of the
prominent fields emerging from the broad dis-
cipline of forensic science. Though the aca-
demic theory and practice of digital forensics
has existed since the 1970s, increased inter-
est in the field has been witnessed recently
owing to escalated risks of cyber-attacks and
computer-related crimes (Altheide & Carvey,
2011). The field of digital forensics is partic-
ularly concerned with the evidence found in
computers, mobile devices, storage devices,
social media and cloud services among other
IT related elements that can be used in trials
and other forms of inquiries (Mohay, 2005).
Data extraction, collation, carving, and the
release of forensic expert reports are what
encompasses the core of practice in the field.
While there are no national standards for
digital forensic credentialing, and for that
matter, no state-level ones, some states have
attempted to bring about such standards.
As will be seen, these efforts have been half-
hearted and somewhat disorganized, many
times causing more problems on the legal
realm than offering solutions. Many of these
states lump Private Investigator (PI) licens-
ing and forensic credentialing into one in an
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attempt to add legitimacy to forensic inves-
tigators, which is quite a peculiar approach.
Below are some of the states and localities
that have attempted to bring about some
consistency to forensics investigations and a
brief overview of their attempts and method-
ologies:
Alabama: Alabama offers no forensic licens-
ing credentials, but the city of Mobile requires
a city-issued private investigator (PI) license
to do forensic work (Leonardo, White, & Rea,
2012).
Colorado: Colorado is somewhat intriguing
as the state does not have any digital foren-
sic requirement, and PI licensing is voluntary.
Because Colorado’s PI licensing is voluntary,
anyone can come to the state and be licensed
as a PI, even if they have broken the law else-
where. According to the Colorado Legislature
itself, there have been numerous instances of
wrongdoing by licensed PIs from Colorado.
District of Columbia: Washington, DC
requires a PI investigator license for digital
forensic examiners (Leonardo, White, & Rea,
2012).
Georgia: Georgia has required that digi-
tal forensic examiners obtain PI licensing
(Leonardo, White, & Rea, 2012).
Indiana: Indiana, as of 2010, has elected
not to require any credentialing or licensing
for digital forensic examiners (SANS, 2010).
Maine: Maine, like Georgia, has mandated
that digital forensic examiners obtain PI li-
censing (Leonardo, White, & Rea, 2012).
Maryland: Maryland requires a PI license
for private investigations, but neither digi-
tal forensic licensing or credentialing is ad-
dressed.
North Carolina: Like Indiana, North Car-
olina has elected not to require licensing of
any kind for forensic investigators (SANS,
2010).
Oklahoma: Oklahoma is really odd as it
permits that a PI license from another state
can be used to get a temporary license in
Oklahoma. This means if an investigator
needs a temporary license in Oklahoma, they
can get one from Colorado first (InfoSec &
Forensic Law, 2013).
Texas: Texas has implemented the notion
that digital forensic examiners/investigators
license themselves as PIs in the state. Texas
has gone so far as to interpret digital investi-
gation to include computer technicians and
repair personnel (Leonardo, White, & Rea,
2012).
Virginia: Virginia codified in 2011, explic-
itly stating that PI licensing requirements did
not apply to any certified forensic individual
employed as an expert witness. Virginia has
reciprocity agreements with several states,
including Georgia (Leonardo, White, & Rea,
2012).
It is worth pointing out that several states
including New York, Nevada, North and
South Carolina, Washington, and Virginia
are pushing to have PIs handle digital foren-
sic investigations. No states were found to be
offering any paths towards an independent
digital forensic licensing and credentialing.
Despite being well established in recent
times, the discipline of digital forensics con-
tinues to face several core problems. A needs
analysis survey by Rogers & Seigfried (2004)
indicated training and certification as the
main challenges, a claim collaborated by sev-
eral stakeholders in the field including the Na-
tional Institute of Justice. There are concerns
that the field is largely fragmented, lacking
a national framework for curricula training
and development. Pollitt (2010) in his pa-
per “A History of Digital Forensics” starts his
work by apologizing to his audience, admit-
ting there is little reliable data and rigorous
logic that he can bring them regarding dig-
ital forensics. He gives a history of digital
forensics based on his 20+ years as a crimi-
nal investigator, then proceeds to make some
bold predictions, acknowledging he will prob-
ably be wrong in many of them. In addition,
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the field as currently constituted has no gold
standard for certification, a central challenge
in instilling consistency and professionalism
in the field. The National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology (NIST) published spe-
cial publication 800-181, a National Initiative
for Cybersecurity Education or NICE as a
reference structure describing the interdisci-
plinary nature of cybersecurity work. NICE
attempts to provide a common lexicon, foun-
dational frameworks, workforce categories,
specialty areas, roles, knowledge descriptions,
skills descriptions, abilities descriptions and
a host of other well-thought-out guidelines,
complete with example systems. This spe-
cial publication would serve as part of an
excellent starting point for digital forensics
framework development and digital forensics
academic development though, by itself, it
would not be sufficient as it is too broadly
focused on cybersecurity. It is designed as a
starting point to be applied in the public, pri-
vate, and academic sectors but does not focus
entirely on forensic training, credentialing, or
accreditation. NICE framework is comprised
of the following components (NIST 800-181):
1. Categories – a high-level grouping of
common cybersecurity functions
2. Specialty Areas – distinct areas of cyber-
security work (includes digital forensic)
3. Work roles – detailed groupings of cy-
bersecurity work comprised of specific
knowledge, skills, and abilities required
to perform tasks in a work role
While NICE can be one of the solid start-
ing points, there is still the egregious issue
of credentialing and certification in digital
forensics, which this paper explores, drawing
from relevant academic literature.
It must be pointed out that various agen-
cies such as NSA and DHS have developed
programs that institutions can apply for and
be designated as meeting the bar set by these
agencies. For example, NSA and DHS have
jointly developed the Centers of Academic
Excellence in Cyber Defense (CAE-CD) pro-
gram. Regionally accredited colleges and uni-
versities can apply to this program and if
approved, have their curricula be designated
as such, receiving formal recognition from the
US government. This is certainly an appeal-
ing program for many universities, includ-
ing the author’s university which has applied
for this exact program, but it is still a frag-
mented solution and a voluntary one, and
one that does not address digital forensics
credentialing and accreditation at a high level;
it focuses primarily on what the NSA and
DHS consider necessary security processes
and controls.
2. RESEARCH
METHODOLOGY
The research was qualitative and descriptive
in nature, utilizing published research in the
field of digital forensic investigation. A search
was conducted in major academic databases
including Google Scholar and ProQuest, iso-
lating articles from reputed journals on the
subject of the federal, state, private, profit
and non-profit credentialing of digital forensic
investigators in the United States. Addition-
ally, private recommendations and practices
of private organizations such as ISC2, Guid-
ance Software, and AccessData were studied.
Each study was evaluated for the relevance
of content and timeliness, with the inclusion
criteria only featuring articles within roughly
15 years of publication.
A review of literature focused on the gen-
eral fundamental theories in the domain, the
problematic issue of credentialing and pos-
sible solutions. Thematic reflections on the
findings on various issues were noted and for-
warded as recommendations and conclusions
on the present state of the identified problem.
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3. LITERATURE
REVIEW
Though many studies in digital forensic in-
vestigations have identified the bias in avail-
able research towards applied aspects of the
domain as opposed to the development of
fundamental theories, prejudice is justified.
This is because of the largely practical na-
ture of forensic science at large and the pres-
sure mounting from external events such as
cyber-terrorism and cyber-crimes, necessitat-
ing more applied research (Nelson, Phillips
& Steuart, 2014). As it emerges, the issue of
credentialing of digital forensic investigators
at various levels falls under applied research
and continues the implied bias. However,
there is credence in the fact that several stud-
ies identify the lack of a proper credentialing
standard as one of the main challenges facing
the profession today. For instance, a study by
Flory (2015) indicated that though the state
of Indiana’s law enforcement agencies was de-
liberate about digital forensic training with
half of their staff trained, their ability could
only be rated from low to mid-range. As
such, there was still an overwhelming need to
create a standard and comprehensive frame-
work for locating experts, obtain a forensic
insight with the help of standard operating
procedures, and finance career advancement
in the domain. The above study shows the
longstanding nature of the challenge of cre-
dentialing and locating competent experts in
digital forensics and thus justifies the focus of
research towards that direction (as opposed
to fundamental theories).
The issue of credentialing, though vast,
seems to be overshadowed by the looming
challenge of lack of a proper, consistent cur-
riculum in the first place. As such, a good
deal of research is currently dedicated to ad-
vancing training and ensuring that there is
a teaching framework that can be followed
successfully by most universities and colleges.
As noted by Lang et al. (2014), the develop-
ment of a digital forensics curriculum should
provide a self-contained and comprehensive
tool for teaching the discipline in universities
given the failure of many institutions to offer
such courses for missing certain aspects of
the entry barrier. In their proposed curricula,
Lang et al. (2014) offered an introductory
and an advanced course and hands-on labora-
tory programs. They, however, failed to focus
or mention at any point, the essence of creden-
tialing and its role in developing the digital
forensics investigator. This seems to be con-
sistent with most curricula and reports on the
status of digital forensics investigation and
related disciplines throughout. For instance,
a report by West Virginia University Foren-
sic Science Initiative (2007) submitted to the
Department of Justice (DoJ) on training and
education of digital forensics investigators
highlights the antecedent qualifications and
a detailed career path but omits otherwise
essential information on credentialing. The
report is comprehensive on other aspects of
training and career path, highlighting the
qualifications, skills, and knowledge needed,
the Associate, Baccalaureate, and advanced
levels of learning in the discipline, but makes
a major omission on certifications and cre-
dentials needed in the profession. This sums
the whole credentialing challenge in available
studies- that most of it loom in the shadow
of a clear training and education framework
for digital forensic investigators.
The literature on building accreditation
and credentialing in digital forensics is quite
unappealing. This is primarily due to the
confusion surrounding digital forensics in the
first place. Losavio et al. (2016) make the
bold allegation that digital forensics is not
yet a profession and attempts justification
of the claim on several grounds. According
to the paper, a profession entails specialized
knowledge, specialized training, highly valu-
able work, self-regulation, a code of ethics,
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high levels of autonomy, and many other sig-
nificant elements. Certification and creden-
tialing are what offer code of ethics, auton-
omy of practice, and evidence of specialized
training, but lack in the discipline as per the
arguments of Losavio et al. (2016). This has
hindered the development of digital forensics
as a profession. A large number of studies
indeed recommend that proper standardized
frameworks are brought into the frame for
credentialing of digital forensic investigators.
Butler (2015) highlights some of these recom-
mendations offered by the National Academy
of Sciences (NAS). They include creating a
standardized accreditation model for digital
forensic investigators to achieve recognition,
consistency, and the “expert” label.
From the reading, it appears that there is
a robust framework for providing oversight to
various accreditation bodies in digital foren-
sics. These include the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST), the
Department of Justice (DoJ) and the Organi-
zation of Scientific Area Committees (OSAC)
which came together to carry out research
and chart a framework that can operational-
ize accreditation bodies. The national com-
mission on forensic science on its part acts
as an advisory body to the DoJ and car-
ries out various roles that form the frame-
work for accreditation. These include advice
on training on science and law, testimony
and reporting, provision of interim solutions,
and above all, accreditation and proficiency
testing (Garfinkel et al., 2009). Therefore,
though there are no consistent accreditation
frameworks, the framework to regulate bod-
ies that offer credentialing exists and operates
with a clear mandate.
The development of accreditation oversight
in digital forensics has since been reported at
the national level. Coordinated by the DoJ
and with the advice of NIST, such frame-
works have emerged as a product of OSAC’s
efforts. According to Butler (2017), OSAC
has been involved in the development and
promulgation of technically-appropriate and
universally accepted documentary standards
that are used by accrediting bodies to audit
forensic laboratories and carry out creden-
tialing of forensic investigators. OSAC has
since developed to include a Forensic Science
Standards Board and various committees and
subcommittees that are responsible for of-
fering oversight in the approval process for
forensic sciences standards as provided by
various scientific area committees.
There are several credentialing bodies,
many of which are international that are ap-
parent in the field of digital forensics. Glady-
shev, Marrington, & Baggili (2014) note that
the bulk of these organizations are either
for profit or privately owned, with the gov-
ernment only providing the business opera-
tional framework that such bodies can use
in carrying out certification and accredita-
tion. They include companies like Mile2 and
ISC2. Other entities include the EC-Council,
the American Board of Information Security
and Computer Forensics (ABISCF), Interna-
tional Association of Computer Investigative
Specialists (IACS) and International Society
of Forensic Computer Examiners (ISFCE)
(Freiling & Schwittay, 2007). Some of these
bodies, in particular, ISC2, use the standards
and frameworks issued by bodies like NIST to
offer certifications such as Certified Informa-
tion System Security Professional (CISSP),
Certified Authorization Professional (CAP),
and Certified Cyber Forensics Professional
(CCFP). For instance, the CAP certification,
which includes Digital Forensics Incident Han-
dling, Risk Management, Continuous Moni-
toring, Auditing, and Assessment, is based
almost entirely on the NIST guidelines, in
particular the 800 series and more specifi-
cally, 800-86 (Guide to Integrating Forensic
Techniques into Incident Response), 800-37
(Risk Management Framework), 800-30 (Risk
Management Guide), 800-39 (Managing In-
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formation Security Risks), 800-53 (Security
Controls), 800-53A (Security Control Assess-
ments), and 800-137 (Continuous Monitoring)
among others. Other organizations such as
EC-Council have had certifications for years
in the field and continue to add more and
revise already existing ones to make them
more attractive to government agencies and
private organizations. These certifications
are updated every 3-5 years with more mate-
rial added, some outdated material removed,
and most are touted as skills that government
and industry look for in today’s forensic and
security professionals. The fact that there
are so many private organizations offering so
many certifications, many in digital forensics,
is testament to the need for having a creden-
tialing and accreditation process as well as a
testament to how private organizations are
utilizing this opportunity to advance their
own goals, primarily financial, even if they
are labeled as non-profit.
4. CASE STUDIES
The National Academy of Sciences stresses
the importance of quality assurance proce-
dures in the practice of forensic science to
“identify mistakes, scientific fraud, examiner
bias, and to confirm the continued validity
and reliability of forensic processes and to
improve on processes that need to be im-
proved” (Jordaan, 2012). In digital forensics
specifically, a comprehensive quality assur-
ance/quality management plan is required
to ensure the credibility of digital forensic
laboratories. Quality assurance in the digital
forensics process is also seen as a critical is-
sue in the practice of forensic science by both
the National Research Council in Washing-
ton, DC and the Association of Chief Police
Officers in London. As the public have seen
in recent years, failure to implement quality
assurance procedures in digital forensics can
lead to innocent persons being convicted of
crimes (Jordaan, 2012).
One particular case which resulted in a
wrongful conviction was that of Connecticut
school teacher Julie Amero (Jordaan, 2012).
According to Alva & Endicott-Popovsky
(2012), the case of State of Connecticut v.
Julie Amero provides an understanding of
how a general lack of knowledge of digital
forensic evidence can lead to the wrongful
conviction of an innocent person. In 2004,
Connecticut substitute teacher Julie Amero
was monitoring a seventh-grade classroom.
Having had to step out into the hallway for
a moment, upon her return, Amero found
two students browsing a website about hair
styling (Alva & Endicott-Popovsky, 2012).
Soon after that, the web browser began open-
ing pop-up advertisements depicting porno-
graphic images. Amero did not turn off the
computer, as she was instructed not to and
was unaware that the monitor itself could
be turned off. Several of the students in the
classroom were exposed to the pornographic
content. During Amero’s trial, the primary
evidence presented by the state was the foren-
sic copy of the hard drive of the computer in
question. Though the digital forensic inves-
tigator, in this case, did not utilize industry
standards to make a copy of the hard drive,
the evidence was still admitted into court
by the judge. The prosecution claimed that
digital evidence would show an Internet his-
tory of pornographic links, indicating that
Amero deliberately visited pornographic web-
sites (Alva & Endicott-Popovsky, 2012).
Later during the ordeal, a computer foren-
sics expert for the defense discovered that
the school’s antivirus software was not reg-
ularly updated nor maintained; also, no an-
tispyware, firewall, or current content filter-
ing tool was found on the school’s computer
(Alva & Endicott-Popovsky, 2012). The de-
fense computer forensics expert was Herb
Horner, a self-employed computer consultant.
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In his examination of the hard drive, imaged
from the school’s computer, Horner found
evidence that spyware had been installed
on the computer, thus causing pornographic
pop-up images to continuously appear on the
monitor (Alva & Endicott-Popovsky, 2012).
Despite the evidence found by Horner, the
judge, in this case, refused to allow the full
testimony of defense expert witness, Herb
Horner, into evidence, claiming that the in-
formation to be presented by Horner was
not made available during discovery prior
to the trial proceedings (Alva & Endicott-
Popovsky, 2012). Ultimately, Amero was
found guilty of “Risk of Injury to a Child,”
and at one point, faced the possible fate of
a 50-year prison sentence. Fortunately, the
State Court of Appeals reversed the decision
made by the lower court, and a motion for
a new trial was accepted. In an effort to
put the events behind her, Amero eventually
pled guilty to a misdemeanor and agreed to
have her teaching license terminated (Alva &
Endicott-Popovsky, 2012). The events lead-
ing up to and during Amero’s trial caused
great emotional, social, and financial stress
on her and her family. Amero and her family
have also experienced several health prob-
lems due to the stress caused by the events
leading up to and during her trial (Alva &
Endicott-Popovsky, 2012).
While the case detailed above shows that
digital forensics is not foolproof and can lead
to the conviction of innocent persons, digi-
tal forensics handled poorly has also led to
guilty persons being acquitted in court. One
example of this is the case of Aaron Caf-
frey. On September 20, 2011, less than two
weeks after the September 11, 2001 (9/11)
terrorist attacks, Aaron Caffrey was charged
with “carryout of a denial of service attack on
the computers of the port of Houston, Texas”
(Brenner, Carrier and Henninger, 2004). Dur-
ing trial proceedings, Caffrey claimed that
the evidence brought against him had been
installed on his computer without his knowl-
edge by malicious actors, installing a Trojan
horse program to gain control of his computer
and launch the DDoS attack. A forensic ex-
amination of his computer by prosecution’s
expert witness, Professor Neil Barrett, found
tools that could be used to launch an at-
tack, but no trace that a Trojan horse had
been planted, despite Caffrey’s claim (George,
2003).
Nevertheless, Aaron Caffrey was acquitted
of launching a distributed denial-of-service
(DDoS) attack in the United States, even
though both prosecutorial and defense attor-
neys confirmed that Caffrey’s computer was
responsible for the DDoS attack (Brenner
et al., 2004). It is assumed that Caffrey’s
defense was able to convince the jury that
a Trojan horse armed with a “wiping tool”
was responsible for the attack, which resulted
in the editing of the system’s log files and
deletion of all trace of the Trojan; the pros-
ecution claimed that no technology existed
that could perform such sophisticated tasks
but without success. Caffrey’s case is part
of the phenomenon commonly known as the
“Trojan horse defense,” which became popular
in the UK during the early 2000s (Brenner
et al., 2004).
5. KEY FINDINGS
There were a number of findings from the
research conducted on digital forensics inves-
tigation. First, it became apparent that cre-
dentialing was a major issue in digital foren-
sics and featured some of the main issues
that were on the radar of major stakeholders
such as the National Academy of Sciences
and NIST (Casey, 2009; 2011). It, there-
fore, qualified to extend the bias on applied
research over fundamental theorizing in the
general domain of forensic science. In ad-
dition, the field in the broader scope was
fragmented and lacking in proper curricula,
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which was the preoccupation of various stake-
holders and educators, rather than the for-
mation of credentialing frameworks (Nance,
Hay, & Bishop, 2009). As such, the issue of
credentialing while important, had been over-
shadowed by the lack of proper, standardized
curricula in the domain.
It was also apparent that the state and fed-
eral levels of governments were largely non-
actors in the credentialing of digital forensic
investigators. According to Garfinkel (2010),
the majority of the bodies involved in accred-
itation and certification were private compa-
nies, including non-profit and for-profit orga-
nizations. They included Mile2, EC-Council,
and ISC2 among others, offering a number of
accreditations such as the Certified Computer
Examiner (CCE) to digital forensic experts.
The scarcity of literature on accreditation and
credentialing makes it difficult to determine
the repute and ratings of these organizations
(Lillard, 2010). However, they appeared to be
the main players in the credentialing in the
absence of state and federal governments ac-
tors. Instead, at least in part, the federal gov-
ernment offered guidelines which these bodies
used for their curricula and certification de-
velopment, giving frameworks and standards
to be applied in the operationalization of the
credentialing bodies. These guidelines were
carried out by the DoJ, National Academy of
Sciences and other affiliates working closely
with the DoJ such as OSAC and NIST.
According to Lundquist (2016), there are
several instances where private digital foren-
sics have failed in assisting DoJ investiga-
tions, leading to the incarceration of the in-
nocent and mistrials in some cases. These
include the case of State of North Carolina
vs. Bradley Cooper and the previously men-
tioned case of State of Connecticut vs. Julie
Amero among others. In each of the high-
lighted cases, there were anomalies in the
process of collection, collation, submission,
and reporting of evidence. Oversight bod-
ies can improve this by coming up with a
standardized framework for digital forensics
that can be applied in all cases. This en-
tails credentialing of experts that the court
can rely upon as experts in cases requiring
digital forensic evidence (Kessler, 2007). At
the moment, oversight appears fragmented
due to the lack of a singular, unifying, and
standardized curriculum to build on at the
national or even at the state level.
6.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the research presented, clearly,
more attention needs be paid to credentialing,
which entails research, funding, and advocacy
at the national and state levels. A national
framework for developing and teaching dig-
ital forensics in order to bring standardiza-
tion to the field is a necessity. This needs
to be followed by a complementary creden-
tialing system which would set the base for
professionalism in digital forensics investiga-
tion methodology, processes, and techniques.
Finally, state and federal governments must
assume active roles in the oversight and ac-
creditation of credentialing bodies with mea-
surable results.
Meyers and Rogers (2004) identify the fol-
lowing three areas where the computer foren-
sics field needs improvement: the creation of
a flexible standard, qualification of expert wit-
nesses and standards regarding the analysis,
preservation, and presentation of digital evi-
dence. Any standard(s) developed for use in
the computer forensics discipline, must allow
for flexibility, so that the standard may adapt
to the continuous changes in technology and
the forensic process. It is also important that
computer forensic standards cover all aspects
of the forensic process; from the search and
seizure of digital evidence to the analysis and
examination of the evidence.
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The second area identified by the authors
as needing improvement is the qualification of
expert witnesses. Because computer forensics
is still considered to be in its infancy, it does
not have any formal credentialing bodies, nor
a formal educational process. Therefore, in
adjudication processes, the courts accept per-
sons as expert witnesses based on their skills
and previous professional work experience.
While this process has not been challenged
thus far, Meyers and Rogers (2004) anticipate
that in the future, expert witnesses’ qualifi-
cations will be more commonly challenged.
The final area identified by the authors as
needing improvement is standards regarding
the analysis, preservation, and presentation
of digital evidence. Meyers and Rogers (2004)
state that there should be “rigorous” stan-
dards and requirements along with contin-
uous updates to the forensic process. Cur-
rently, the common method used to analyze
digital evidence relies mostly on the software
and/or hardware an expert uses in the anal-
ysis of the evidence; the authors challenge
that relying solely on the software/hardware
does not allow experts to fully understand
the digital forensics process so that they may
articulate the process to a judge in court
proceedings.
Finally, Meyers and Rogers (2004) stress
the importance of the implementation of a
universal system for certifying those who
claims to be computer forensic profession-
als, as a continuous lack of professional cer-
tification, investigative standards, and peer
review process may eventually result in com-
puter forensics being labeled as “junk science”
instead of an accepted scientific discipline
(Meyers & Rogers, 2004).
7. POSSIBLE
OUTLINES FOR A
FRAMEWORK
The topic of presenting a potential full solu-
tion and/or framework for digital forensics
can arguably be a doctorate dissertation in
its own right. It is a large undertaking and
requires a great deal of research. One can
argue that even then it truly requires the
efforts of governments, law enforcement, and
academics to put forth a viable solution. Nev-
ertheless, the following possible outlines are
intended to present the reader with some pos-
sibilities that are currently lacking in the field
and could serve as starting points.
Abdalla, Hazem, and Hashem (2007) offer
a guideline model for digital forensic investi-
gation in their paper presented at the annual
ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Se-
curity and Law (Abdalla, Hazem, Hashem,
2007). In it they first present several existing
models to include:
1. US Department of Justice’s Electronic
Crime Scene Investigation: A guide to
first responders
2. An Abstract Digital Forensic Model (Re-
ith & Gunsch, 2002)
3. The Integrated Digital Investigation
Model consisting of 5 groups of 17 phases
total (Carrier & Spafford, 2003)
4. A Hierarchical, Objectives-Based Frame-
work for the Digital Investigation Pro-
cess (Beebe & Clarke, 2004)
The authors then proceed to offer their
own model which includes the following:
1. Preparation phase which includes pre-
preparation, case evaluation, prepara-
tion of detailed design for the case, and
determination of required resources.
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2. Physical forensic and investigation phase
which has the goal of collecting, preserv-
ing, and analyzing the physical evidence
with an attempt to try and reconstruct
the crime scene.
3. Digital forensic phase which needs to
identify and collect electronic events that
may have occurred and proceed with
analyses.
4. Reporting and presentation phase which
needs to be based entirely on the pol-
icy and laws of each jurisdiction (e.g.,
state, county, country) and presents the
conclusions and corresponding evidence
from the investigation.
5. Closure phase which requires reviewing
the whole investigation process, deter-
mining whether the evidence found and
collected solve the case in a forensically
sound manner.
The model presented by Abdalla, Hazem,
and Hashem (2007), can be considered to be
universal, meaning that the authors try to
have a model that is applicable in every pos-
sible locality. The model does not address
issues when dealing with national security
and intelligence systems that require higher
sensitivity. Nevertheless, it, together with
NICE from NIST mentioned previously as
well as the other models mentioned can form
a solid starting point for the development of a
digital forensic investigation framework that
once formulated, should be sophisticated and
flexible enough to apply to a wide range of
localities and entities. Part of the framework
would need to discuss how to properly edu-
cate and credential would-be investigators.
At its heart, a digital forensic framework
must address the following areas:
1. Preparation phase
2. Acquisition phase
3. Analysis phase
4. Reporting phase
5. Legal phase
6. Education phase
7. Credentialing phase
8. Accreditation phase
This means that digital forensic investiga-
tors must be trained in these 8 main phases.
At the state and/or federal level, interested
investigators must be required to register and
take rigorous exams. These exams must ad-
dress the phases of digital investigation and
evaluate would-be investigators understand-
ing of the ideals and processes involved in do-
ing digital investigations. These exams must
focus on assessing a test taker’s ability to un-
derstand the digital forensic processes with
the realization of its legal and ethical impor-
tance. The passing of these exams must be
made necessary to receive a state or federal li-
cense to practice digital forensic investigation.
This would form the backbone of the creden-
tialing process of investigators. Given that
such frameworks would have to be turned
into curricula at the academic level in or-
der to prepare interested applicants in digital
forensics, that, in turn, would bring about
the accreditation phase required for digital
forensics as all reputable universities teach-
ing the field must be appropriately accredited.
Existing private sector certifications must be
made moot and removed as they generally
serve the financial interest of the organization
and not that of the general public.
8. CONCLUSION
The present research brings to light obstinate
issues in the credentialing of digital foren-
sic investigators. The status quo reveals a
troubling scenario of governments’ lack of full
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participation, lack of proper certification bod-
ies, and oversight. This has, however, been
overshadowed by the apparent lack of a con-
sistent curriculum at the national and state
levels to guide the teaching of digital forensics
at the university level and other institutions
of higher learning. The findings at a glance
show that there is a lot to do to instill profes-
sionalism and inspire further development of
digital forensics not only as a branch of foren-
sic science but as an independent domain
emerging in contemporary scholarship. If the
recommendations issued are to be followed,
there shall not only be a solution at the aca-
demic level of digital forensics but also at the
professional level, which remains a cause for
concern. The governments should spearhead
curricular reinvention and development and
take their active roles in the promotion of
a unified credentialing framework to guide
other bodies in the same direction.
To be sure, federal agencies such as FBI,
Secret Service, IRS, and DoD have their
own certification and accreditation processes.
NIST also offers excellent certification and ac-
creditation guidelines in its 800 series Special
Publications. External certification and ac-
creditation processes supported and approved
by governments are desirable as they bring
consistency and professionalism to the profes-
sion of digital forensics. Programs developed
by DoD, NIST, DHS, etc. are certainly use-
ful and at times quite necessary, but these
efforts are not coordinated and often target
the specific needs of the agency developing it.
Many times, they are too broad, attempting
to address too much. What is needed is a
collective and coordinated effort by the gov-
ernments, and this cannot come soon enough.
The recent breaches of the federal Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) which leaked
over 22 million classified personnel records
and Equifax’s breach resulting in over 146
million private records of Americans being
stolen show the tremendous need for proper
education, credentialing, and accreditation
of professionals in digital forensics investiga-
tions.
Finally, there will never be perfect solu-
tions to digital forensics, and any attempt
at designing a framework with perfection in
mind would be futile. This is because it
is impossible to plan out every imaginable
scenario. The framework should create the
needed structure, academics would provide
the proper education and lab skills lumped
up as credentialing, and accrediting bodies
would provide oversight of the whole thing.
With that in place, there is still the profes-
sional outlook and behavior of the investiga-
tor, along with how much creativity he or she
brings to the job. Consider the simple case of
whether during an investigation, a computer
that is running should be left on while it is
being triaged or be turned off and taken to a
laboratory first.
There cannot be a single answer or a simple
answer to such situations. Part of the educa-
tion and design has to be teaching would-be
investigators that each situation is unique
and while requiring proper and professional
steps to be taught and to be followed, cases
also need the proper application of judicial
prudence on the part of the examiner. An-
other situation that is a major issue is the
application of encryption to devices. It is still
the case that most devices are not encrypted
and can be analyzed without the worry of
dealing with encryption. That being the case,
investigators will come across devices that
may be encrypted and then would have to
make decisions as to what to do. For instance,
if coming across a Windows machine that
“might” be encrypted but is currently on and
running, a professional investigator should
have the skills to take a memory dump of
the running system since memory is never en-
crypted. Given the large memories of today’s
computers, a wealth of information may be
available just from the memory dump alone.
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Having properly dumped the memory, the in-
vestigator can then determine from the mem-
ory whether the computer is using encryption
at all and then make a proper assessment on
how to take the next steps. Skills such as
this are taught in proper accredited curricula
and also come by with some experience and
creativity. It should go without saying that
such skills are best taught and tried in the
academic and laboratories, in a structured
and controlled environment, instead of rogue
investigators botching up investigations while
they learn on the job!
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